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After learning a particular target stimulus, such as a location, humans’ judgments of whether a 
particular stimulus is the target or not is affected by the range of stimuli presented on tests. In 
such frequently found range effects, the peak of “yes” responses shifts toward the middle of 
the range of tested stimuli. Humans also code both the metric value and categorical information 
regarding a target stimulus, and use both forms of codes, such that responses are biased 
toward the category middle (category adjustment model, Duffy et al., 2010). Categorical codes 
should also affect range effects, with a test range crossing category boundaries producing less 
range effect than a test range within a category. We examined a set of past results presented 
in a review of range effects in humans (Thomas, 1993) for functional explanations in light 
of categorical coding, and found that all results could be reasonably explained. Additional 
experiments comparing range effects across vs. within a category found limited supporting 
evidence, perhaps because the range effects were weak. The adaptive functions of using (in 
part) categorical coding accounts for many seemingly peculiar biases in human cognition.
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direction (for peak shift), toward S− instead of away from it, if the 
range pushed well past S− (Thomas et al., 1991). Since that date, it 
should be added that definitive evidence for peak shift in humans 
has been found, in studies that controlled carefully for range effects 
(spatial memory: Cheng and Spetch, 2002; face identification: Lewis 
and Johnston, 1999; Spetch et al., 2004).
Thomas (1993) has offered a mechanistic explanation for 
range effects, in terms of the use of an adaptation level (Helson, 
1964). The adaptation level is the mean of the range of stimuli 
presented, and humans’ use of the adaptation level is thought 
to drive the generalization gradient. On a series of unrewarded 
tests without feedback, the typical conditions for showing range 
effects, the adaptation level shifts to the middle of the test range. 
If the memory of S+ is biased by the adaptation level, then the 
generalization gradient will shift toward the middle of the range, 
explaining range effects.
In this paper, we propose a functional account of range effects 
as well, in terms of the category adjustment model (CAM, Duffy 
et al., 2010), which is derived from a substantial body of research by 
Huttenlocher et al. (1991, 1994, 2000, 2004) and Newcombe et al. 
(1999). The basic premise is that if the exact metric memory of the 
particular stimulus (S+ in this case) is to some extent uncertain 
(which is almost always the case), then it is adaptive to bias the 
judgment toward the middle of the category to which the stimulus 
belongs. Although responses will then be systematically biased, the 
error will on the whole be smaller. The reason stems from Bayes’ 
theorem, and in brief, it comes down to using the maximal amount 
of information for making a judgment. Bias toward the category 
middle comes down to using two sources of information instead 
of one. Both the inexact metric memory and the category informa-
tion (represented by the mean of the category) are combined in 
decision making. A large body of theoretical considerations and 
IntroductIon
Generalization is a ubiquitous phenomenon of learning found in 
all species examined so far. When an animal learns to respond to 
one specific stimulus (S+) to obtain an outcome, the animal also 
responds to perceptually distinguishable stimuli that are similar 
to S+ (Guttman and Kalish, 1956). It is textbook knowledge that 
generalization gradients are not fixed for a species and a stimulus 
domain, but depend crucially on the learning experience (Domjan, 
2006; Bouton, 2007). Discrimination training on similar stimuli 
has large effects on the generalization gradient, often leading to 
peak shift. In peak-shift experimental paradigms, the subject is 
trained to respond to S+, but a similar stimulus to S+, the S− is 
also presented during training and responding to S− either goes 
unrewarded or sometimes is punished. When subsequently tested 
with a range of stimuli including S+ and S−, the stimulus eliciting 
the most responding is often not S+, but a stimulus shifted from 
S+ in the direction away from S− (Hanson, 1959). Peak shift has 
been found in a large range of species (Purtle, 1973; Rilling, 1977), 
including humans (Lewis and Johnston, 1999; Cheng and Spetch, 
2002; Spetch et al., 2004). Functionally, peak shift might be adaptive 
in minimizing errors arising from uncertain signals, or signal-borne 
errors (Lynn et al., 2005).
Another phenomenon found especially in human generalization 
gradients is range effect, the topic of this paper. What this means is 
that after the initial learning experience, whether with a single S+ 
or discrimination training with S+ and S−s, the range of stimuli 
presented in a series of tests affects the generalization gradient. 
The peak of responding is often biased toward the middle of the 
range used on tests. In a thorough review of the human literature 
in 1993, Thomas (1993) concluded that almost all data purporting 
to show peak shift are better thought of as range effects. In some 
especially convincing cases, the peak shift was actually in the wrong 
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within one side vs. the range across the center boundary. If category 
information limits range effects, we predicted more generalization 
within category than across categories, with the category boundary 
limiting range effects.
We included both horizontal and vertical spatial locations 
in anticipation that different results might appear for these two 
dimensions, because gravity defines the vertical up-down axis. 
There is evidence from studies with both humans and non-humans 
to suggest that spatial perception and memory might differ for 
locations along the vertical and horizontal dimensions. For exam-
ple, people are better at detecting bilateral symmetry when the axis 
of symmetry is vertical than when it is horizontal (Wenderoth, 
1994; Evans et al., 2000), and they remember the vertical location 
of objects in an organized scene for longer than they remember 
the horizontal location of objects (Mandler and Parker, 1976). 
People appear to perceive line orientation as being categorical near 
the vertical axis but as continuous near the horizontal boundary 
(Quinn, 2004), and they sometimes show a downward bias that 
leads to better accuracy in remembering locations below eye level 
than locations above eye level (Wilson et al., 2004; Tlauka et al., 
2007). Pigeons have also been found to show dimensional differ-
ences in remembering locations on a computer screen: they prima-
rily used global information (location on the screen) in the vertical 
dimension but local information (location within the stimulus 
array) in the horizontal dimension (Legge et al., 2009). Finally, 
fish favored vertical over horizontal information in a Y-maze 
task (Holbrook and Burt de Perera, 2009). The authors suggested 
that hydrostatic pressure may provide an extra cue in the vertical 
dimension. Thus a difference between the effects of categorical 
information on range effects might appear for the vertical and 
horizontal dimensions.
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
Participants were recruited by advertisements posted on the campus 
of Macquarie University, and were paid for their participation. Each 
of four experiments used 40 participants of mixed sexes.
MaterIals
The task was presented on one of two LCD monitors (51 cm × 32 cm, 
43 cm × 27 cm). In each task, the experimental space was delimited 
by a light gray square of 22.2 cm centered on the monitor. In two 
different tasks performed by each participant, either a horizontal or 
a vertical line segment (13.3 cm) was centered in the square, in effect 
defining a one-dimensional space for each task. Each task in each 
experiment was analyzed separately. A small open dot (2.1 mm) 
was presented just above (horizontal condition) or just to the right 
(vertical condition) of the line (2.1-mm distance) to indicate target 
or test locations (Figure 1).
desIgn
Experiments differed in procedural details such as the number 
of trials given to participants and spacing and ranges of test 
stimuli, but each contained the same basic design, which applied 
to both horizontal and vertical tasks. Each experiment contained 
a number of test locations (four or eight) as a repeated-measures 
factor. The target location (S+) was always at one end of the 
empirical evidence suggests a functional advantage for combining 
two sources of information (reviews: Deneve and Pouget, 2004; 
Cheng et al., 2007; Körding, 2007).
Much of the evidence for category adjustment processes come 
from the spatial domain, a reason why we are testing spatial range 
effects in this paper. Humans process space at both a metric (coor-
dinate) level and a categorical level (Kosslyn, 1987; Trojano et al., 
2002), and their tendency to naturally categorize space can bias 
spatial memory. Thus, Huttenlocher et al. (1994) had children of 
different ages remember a location along a linear dimension (on 
paper or in a long narrow sandbox). Toddlers of 16–24 months 
showed biases toward the center of the dimension, revealing the 
use of a single undifferentiated category of the entire space. By 
the time children entered school, they seemed to divide the space 
into two halves conceptually; their responses were biased toward 
the middle of the two halves of the dimension. Huttenlocher et al. 
(1991) presented human adults with a location on an unmarked 
circle to remember. Recall was biased toward the centroids of each 
quadrant, indicating a division of spatial categories into two halves 
along each of the vertical and horizontal dimensions. In a length 
reproduction task, Duffy et al. (2010) determined that the bias is 
toward the mean of the entire range of presented lengths (form-
ing a single category), and not toward other measures of central 
tendency including the median and the mode. This is in line with 
the statistical theory behind the Bayesian considerations underly-
ing the CAM.
In the “General Discussion,” we discuss in detail how the CAM 
can account for all the patterns of range effects reviewed by Thomas 
(1993). For the rest of the introduction, we put forth the motiva-
tion for the experiments. If category adjustment is affecting range 
effects, then category boundaries ought to limit the extent of range 
effects. Range effects should be more prevalent within a category 
than across a category boundary. Thomas (1993) reviewed one 
intriguing study showing this (Tomie and Thomas, 1974). Humans 
learned a bluish-green color as S+, with the color purportedly on 
the blue side of the blue/green color boundary. Range effects were 
larger toward the blue side (within color category) than to the green 
side (across the color boundary). The experiment lacked proper 
counterbalancing (no green S+ was presented) and a formal meas-
ure of the color boundary, so that the suggestive evidence is not 
the best for showing the predicted category effects. We test here the 
effects of category boundaries on range effects in a spatial memory 
task, in which previous research has firmly established a division of 
space conceptually into two sides (Huttenlocher et al., 1991, 1994). 
We institute conditions most conducive to obtaining spatial range 
effects, and compare range effect within spatial category (all test 
locations on one side of center) vs. across categories (range crosses 
the middle). Participants were presented with a single learning trial 
to remember the S+ location just on one side of center, on a vertical 
line or a horizontal line (separate conditions). Minimal learning 
experience should facilitate range effects (Thomas, 1993). They 
were then presented with many tests without feedback, another 
condition for maximizing range effects. Extreme ranges were used, 
in that S+ was at one end of the range. S+ location was counter-
balanced across participants (either just to the left or just to the 
right of center horizontally, or else just above or just below center 
vertically). We compared generalization gradients for the range 
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Procedure
The four experiments differed in the number and spacing of test 
stimuli (range) and the location of S+. As descriptions of each 
experiment apply to both tasks, we will speak of distance from 
center to encompass left, right, above, and below the center of the 
line. In the Narrow-4 experiment, S+ was 1.25 mm from center. The 
test range was four locations, 1.25 mm apart, spanning away from 
center or crossing the center. In the Narrow-8, S+ was also 1.25 mm 
from center, but the test range was eight locations, 1.25 mm apart. 
In the Wide-4 experiment, S+ was 5 mm from center; the test range 
consisted of four locations 5 mm apart. In the Wide-8 experiment, 
S+ was also 5 mm from center, but the test range consisted of eight 
locations 5 mm apart.
Upon arrival, participants filled out and signed consent forms and 
then were given brief instructions for the simple tasks. The target 
location was first presented, with the participant given one chance 
(of unlimited duration) to examine the location to be remembered. 
Most participants took less than a minute examining the location. 
She/he then pressed the space bar to continue. A series of test trials 
then ensued, each presenting one of the test locations in a random 
order. For each presented location, the participant pressed “1” for 
answering yes that is the target location or “0” for no. The test stimu-
lus was removed only after the participant entered an answer. Intertest 
interval was 2.5 s. After all the tests, the participant received instruc-
tions that the second task would begin (vertical after horizontal or 
horizontal after vertical). As soon as the participant hit the space bar, 
the second task ensued, which followed the same procedure as the 
first task. After completing both tasks, the participant entered her/
his gender and age and then was debriefed and thanked.
The Narrow-4 experiment consisted of 10 tests at each loca-
tion, thus 40 tests in each of the horizontal and vertical tasks. The 
Narrow-8 experiment consisted of 10 tests at each location, thus 
80 tests in each task. The Wide-4 experiment consisted of 20 tests 
at each location, thus 80 tests in each task. The Wide-8 experiment 
consisted of 10 tests at each location, thus 80 tests in each task.
analysIs
The horizontal and vertical tasks were analyzed separately, as was 
each experiment. The locations (repeated-measures factor) were 
coded in terms of distance from S+: S+, S1, S2… This in effect 
reflects the data for half the participants so that the range in all cases 
is going in the same direction. The independent between-subject 
variable was category crossing: the range either stayed within cat-
egory (one side) or crossed categories (crossed center). A mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed in each case, ignoring 
counterbalancing factors. Two different dependent variables were 
analyzed: the proportion of “yes” answers, and reaction time (time 
taken to enter a response). As already mentioned, we analyzed the 
data with the gender factor added in separate analyses, and report 
them separately, as the few gender effects are tangential to the main 
account. Alpha level was set at p = 0.05.
results and dIscussIon
ProPortIon of “yes” resPonses
A key comparison is the extent of generalization across category 
boundaries vs. within categories (range all on one side). If the cat-
egory limits the extent of range effects, the generalization gradient 
range of test locations, a manipulation designed to maximize 
range effects. It was near the center of the line (just to the left or 
just to the right in the horizontal task, just above or just below 
in the vertical task). We will label the test locations S+, S1, S2, 
etc. The key factor (between-subjects) was that range of test 
locations either crossed the center or else ranged away from the 
center and stayed on one side. Other factors were counterbal-
anced across participants, but not entered into statistical analyses. 
These include the order of tasks (vertical first or horizontal first) 
and S+ location (left/above or right/below). In separate analy-
ses, we examined sex differences, and report the few significant 
statistical effects found.
Figure 1 | An illustration of the stimulus locations presented for the task 
in half the set ups used in the experiments. The dashed vertical or 
horizontal lines indicate the center, a line not shown to participants in the 
experiments. The location closest to the center, a filled dot, is the target (S+); 
the other locations shown as open dots are test locations. Shown are 
conditions in which the target is just to the left of center along the horizontal 
line, or just above the center along the vertical line. The other set ups have 
targets just to the right of center along the horizontal line, or just below the 
center along the vertical line, forming mirror images of the locations shown in 
the figure.
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interaction effect (stimulus location by Category crossing) to a 
stronger extent than females (significant gender by stimulus loca-
tion by Category crossing effect, F(7,252) = 3.22, p = 0.043).
The results show that differential generalization gradients across 
vs. within category boundaries were only found on the horizontal 
dimension, and with wide spacing increasing the span of the range. 
An effect of category boundary in the horizontal dimension but not 
in the vertical dimension is consistent with our expectation, based 
on the literature, that we might see differences in the effect across 
dimensions. The number of elements (presented locations) in the 
range was not crucial, as the Narrow-4 and Narrow-8 conditions both 
failed to reveal differential generalization gradients, while the Wide-4 
and the Wide-8 conditions both did on the horizontal dimension. 
The target in the narrow spacing condition was very near the center 
and may have been categorized as falling in a center region rather than 
on the right or left side. This would in effect destroy the purported 
boundary at the center. The middle of a center region would be the 
center of the line, and adjusting for this prototype (averaging it with 
the metric memory of the target) would hardly have an effect on any 
range of stimuli. In contrast, the target in the wide spacing condi-
tions clearly fell to one side or the other of the center and so would 
should be steeper across categories than within categories. The pro-
portion of “yes” responses shows a peak at the target (S+) location, 
and drops off in an orderly gradient in all experimental conditions 
(Figures 2–5). The spacing of test stimuli and the dimension, hori-
zontal, or vertical, both seem to influence results. Differences in 
generalization gradients across vs. within category boundaries are 
most apparent for the horizontal dimension, and with wide spacing 
of test stimuli (Figures 2–5). Formal statistics confirm these impres-
sions (Table 1). In every experimental task, strong generalization 
gradient effects were found in the form of a main effect of stimulus 
location. A significant interaction of stimulus location with category 
crossing (range across boundaries or within one side), however, was 
only found on the horizontal task and with wide spacing of stimuli. 
On the horizontal task, both the Wide-4 and the Wide-8 experiments 
showed this predicted effect. In each of these two cases, a main 
effect of Category crossing was also found: participants presented 
with a range all on one side made more “yes” responses than those 
presented with a range crossing the center.
The following gender effects were found. In the Wide-4 experi-
ment, males answered “yes” more often than females on the vertical 
task. In the Wide-8 horizontal task, males showed the predicted 
Figure 2 | Proportion of “yes” responses (A, B, M ± SeM) and reaction times (C, M ± SeM) in the Narrow-4 experiment, with narrow spacing between 
stimulus locations and four test locations.
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in which all locations were on one side of center, but comparing a 
range of 4 vs. a range of 8. The range of 8 should produce more range 
effect. We compared narrow- and wide-spacing separately, on the 
four locations common to both ranges, using mixed ANOVAs. The 
key prediction would be a range size (4 vs. 8) by location interaction. 
Although a location main effect was obtained for both narrow (hori-
zontal: F(3,114) = 2.81, p = 0.043; vertical: F(3,114) = 3.52, p = 0.017) 
and wide spacing (horizontal: F(3,114) = 37.63, p < 0.001; vertical: 
F(3,114) = 42.55, p < 0.001), the interaction term was not significant 
in the narrow spacing (horizontal: F(3,114) = 1.41, p = 0.244; vertical: 
F(3,114) = 2.33, p = 0.078). The interaction term approached sig-
nificance in the wide spacing (horizontal: F(3,114) = 2.47, p = 0.065; 
vertical: F(3,114) = 2.63, p = 0.054), suggesting a weak range effect 
found only for the wide spacing.
general dIscussIon
dIscussIon of results
In these simple experiments, we predicted larger range effects for 
ranges within a category (one side of center) than across categories 
(crossing the center). Different interstimulus spacing and different 
dimensions (vertical or horizontal) were tested in different experi-
ments. The results provide limited support for the predictions. When 
the spacing between stimulus locations was narrow (1.25 mm), with 
all locations in the central region, range effects were not different 
within category vs. across category boundaries. This lack of differ-
ence is perhaps not surprising given that we found no evidence for 
range effects at all in these conditions. For wide interstimulus spacing 
(5 mm between locations), different range effects were obtained in the 
horizontal dimension, but not the vertical dimension, consistent with 
the literature suggesting that spatial information may be processed 
differently in the horizontal and vertical dimensions. The significant 
effects obtained in the horizontal wide spacing conditions, although 
statistically significant, were not large in that the peak location for “yes” 
responding remained the S+ in all conditions. Nevertheless, the flatter 
generalization gradients in the within-boundary conditions than in 
the across-boundary conditions are clearly consistent with our predic-
tion that category boundaries could reduce range effects.
be more likely to be categorized as falling on the left or right side, 
whose centers are far from the target. We admit that this is a post hoc 
interpretation requiring corroborating evidence in its support.
reactIon tIMes
Reaction times (Figures 2–5) show a pattern in most conditions in 
which locations closer to S+ have slower latencies. Statistically, the 
effect of stimulus locations is strong and significant for all condi-
tions except the vertical task of the Narrow-4 experiment (Table 2). 
No significant interactions with Category crossing (within one side 
or across the center) was found in any condition.
In terms of gender differences, in the Wide-4 experiment, a gender 
by stimulus location interaction was found (F(3,108) = 3.45, p = 0.019) 
on the vertical task, reflecting the fact the females were especially 
slow on the S+ test stimulus. In the Narrow-8 experiments, a gender 
by stimulus location interaction was also found (F(7,252) = 2.51, 
p = 0.017) on the horizontal task, reflecting the fact that males show 
larger differences in reaction time across locations. On the vertical 
task in the Narrow-8 experiment, a three-way interaction of gender 
by stimulus location by Category crossing was found (F(7,252) = 2.47, 
p = 0.018), reflecting the fact that males presented a range that crossed 
the center were especially slow on locations near S+.
The reaction time data are straight forward and present no sur-
prises. Locations far from S+ are easy to classify as non-target, while 
those nearer S+ require some effort to distinguish whether they are 
the target location or not.
testIng for range effects
A final analysis was conducted to examine the extent of range effects. 
Peaks of “yes” responses at S+ suggest little by way of range effects, 
even though we effected manipulations to maximize the possibility of 
obtaining range effects. Very little training, extreme ranges with S+ at 
one end, and multiple tests without feedback all form part of the recipe 
for producing range effects. One prediction from past manipulations 
of ranges (Thomas et al., 1991; Thomas, 1993) is that with S+ at one 
end of the range, the larger the range, the larger should be the range 
effect. We thus compared across experiments, picking the conditions 
Table 1 | Statistical effects for proportion of “yes” responses.
experiment Dimension effect df num, denom F p Description
Narrow, four locations Horizontal Stimulus location 3, 114 24.55 <0.001 Generalization gradient
 Vertical Stimulus location 3, 114 11.28 <0.001 Generalization gradient
Wide, four locations Horizontal Category crossing 1, 38 7.75 0.008 More yeses within  
      than across categories
  Stimulus location 3, 114 45.24 <0.001 Generalization gradient
  Category by Stimulus location 3, 114 3.29 0.023 Predicted effect
 Vertical Stimulus location 3, 114 30.85 <0.001 Generalization gradient
Narrow, eight locations Horizontal Stimulus location 7, 266 57.55 <0.001 Generalization gradient
 Vertical Stimulus location 7, 266 44.42 <0.001 Generalization gradient
Wide, eight locations Horizontal Category crossing 1, 38 5.09 0.03 More yeses within 
      than across categories
  Stimulus location 7, 266 93.12 <0.001 Generalization gradient
  Category by Stimulus location 7, 266 3.61 0.001 Predicted effect
 Vertical Stimulus location 7, 266 102.15 <0.001 Generalization gradient
Predicted interaction effects in italics.
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famous formulation of four different why questions. Mechanistic 
explanations focus on how such effects would arise from the brain 
and cognitive systems underlying humans’ task performance. We 
do not have a better mechanistic model than what Thomas (1993) 
presented, which, with some adjustments, accounted for the results 
well. Our functional interpretation, and those of Huttenlocher and 
colleagues as well, focus instead on why it would be adaptive that we 
should behave in such a fashion, and ultimately on why such seem-
ingly peculiar biases would have been selected in evolution.
Range effects used to be called the central tendency effect or central 
tendency shift (Thomas and Jones, 1962; Helson and Avant, 1967). 
Subjects had to learn a target value along one stimulus dimension, 
and then were presented a range of stimuli along that dimension. 
The peak of responding “yes” tended to shift toward the middle of 
the test range presented, along dimensions of wavelength of light 
(Thomas and Jones, 1962) or sizes of squares (Helson and Avant, 
1967). Subjects thus averaged their presumably uncertain memory 
of the target value with the mean of a category, the range presented 
on tests. These are the predictions that CAM would make.
Thomas (1993) mentioned that the peak of responding “yes” in 
Thomas and Jones’s (1962) study shifted gradually from the target 
stimulus value toward the mean of the test range. Such gradual shifting 
The failure to find evidence for range effects at all with narrow 
spacing can be explained by the CAM, if we assume that partici-
pants were coding the target as belonging to a narrow center region. 
The narrowness of the category (i.e., the center location) serves to 
limit range effects. Evidence for such a limiting effect of a narrow 
category has been found in past research (Thomas and Thomas, 
1974) reviewed below.
functIonal InterPretatIons of range effects In huMans
The results obtained here should be considered in the light of how 
functional interpretations based on the CAM (Huttenlocher et al., 
1991, 1994, 2000; Newcombe et al., 1999; Duffy et al., 2010) can 
account for extant results. We opted to discuss a sizeable impartial 
set of studies, those reviewed by Thomas (1993). Thomas did not 
cite any of the work of Huttenlocher and colleagues, with some key 
papers appearing after Thomas’s publication (Huttenlocher et al., 
2000; Duffy et al., 2010). The studies reviewed in Thomas’s review 
have not been cherry-picked with the CAM in mind.
We emphasize from the outset that we are not presenting an alter-
native mechanistic explanation in opposition to Thomas’s (1993) 
 adaptation-level analysis. Functional explanations are a different 
type of explanation, a different why question from Tinbergen’s (1963) 
Figure 3 | Proportion of “yes” responses (A, B, M ± SeM) and reaction times (C, M ± SeM) in the Wide-4 experiment, with wide spacing between stimulus 
locations and four test locations.
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of the target would fade, making it less reliable, and (2) the range of 
the category and its middle become better defined. Weighting for the 
category mean should thus increase as testing continues.
Another prediction from Thomas’s (1993) adaptation-level 
model is “that greater asymmetry of the test series will produce a 
larger central tendency shift” (p. 662). Thomas and Jones (1962) 
toward the category mean was documented in a number of other stud-
ies on other dimensions (visual brightness: Thomas et al., 1974; lifted 
weights: Hébert et al., 1974; wavelengths of light: Tomie and Thomas, 
1974; brightness: Thomas et al., 1973). CAM predicts this effect. The 
weighting of cues (target memory vs. mean of category) should be 
in inverse proportion to reliability. As tests wear on, (1) the memory 
Figure 4 | Proportion of “yes” responses (A, B, M ± SeM) and reaction times (C, M ± SeM) in Narrow-8 experiment, with narrow spacing between 
stimulus locations and eight test locations.
Table 2 | Statistical effects for reaction times.
experiment Dimension effect df num, denom F p Description
Narrow, four locations Horizontal Stimulus location 3, 114 3.83 0.012 Faster away from S+
 Vertical No effects    
Wide, four locations Horizontal Stimulus location 3, 114 20.92 <0.001 Faster away from S+
 Vertical Stimulus location 3, 114 16.14 <0.001 Faster away from S+
Narrow, eight locations Horizontal Stimulus location 7, 266 17.07 <0.001 Faster away from S+
 Vertical Stimulus location 7, 266 19.74 <0.001 Faster away from S+
Wide, eight locations Horizontal Stimulus location 7, 266 34 <0.001 Faster away from S+
 Vertical Stimulus location 7, 266 36.93 <0.001 Faster away from S+
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averaged. Two early studies by Hébert and Capeheart (1969) and 
Hébert et al. (1974) showed data on lifted weights consistent with 
this interpretation. The same range was presented on tests to dif-
ferent subjects, but for one group, the weights closer to the target 
were over-represented, while for a second group, weights further 
from the target were over-represented. The latter group showed a 
larger central tendency shift, consistent with Duffy et al.’s (2010) 
analysis.
Still on the topic of the mean of a category, psychophysical scal-
ing ought to matter in determining the mean, and from there to 
affecting range effects. Duffy et al.’s (2010) linear size dimension 
was assumed to fall on a linear scale, an assumption that we think is 
justified (Cheng and Spetch, 2002). If the psychophysical scale is not 
linear, however, then linear averaging of the physical stimulus values 
will in general not deliver the psychophysical mean. Hébert et al. 
(1974) found that for lifted weights, range effects in the downward 
direction were larger than shifts in the upward direction. They inter-
preted their results as showing that the central tendency shift was 
not toward the arithmetic mean of the range, but toward what the 
authors calculated the subjective or psychophysical mean to be, an 
interpretation echoed by Thomas (1993). A similar interpretation 
was given by Thomas et al. (1974) for their results on the dimension 
of light intensity. CAM predicts such outcomes: the psychophysical 
mean, being the mean on the subjective or psychophysical scale, is 
the mean that should be used in a weighted average of remembered 
category mean and target value.
and Helson and Avant (1967) both found this, and later Thomas 
et al. (1991) found this again with line angles as the stimulus dimen-
sion. Empirically, Duffy et al. (2010) showed that the category is 
represented by its mean. Theoretically, for Bayesian reasons, the 
averaging needs to be based on the category mean (Duffy et al., 
2010). The memory of the mean is averaged with the memory of 
the target. Increasing the asymmetry of the test series amounts to 
moving its mean further from the target, increasing the central 
tendency shift.
If the category can be made very small around the target, 
and that category is well remembered, it ought to be given a 
hefty weight, and reduce errors of memory greatly. Thomas and 
Thomas (1974) gave subjects a line angle to remember. Under 
standard conditions, range effects were prominent. One group, 
however, was instructed to think of the line as a clock hand, and 
to remember the time it indicated. Thus a 60° angle may be coded 
as indicating 1 o’clock. Such a category is both narrow and well 
remembered, and should be relied on greatly. Most non-target 
stimuli could be rejected as not belonging to the correct cat-
egory. Subjects given such clock-face instructions apparently did 
just that, producing no central tendency shift at all. Our partici-
pants in the narrow-spacing conditions might have shown such 
an effect.
Duffy et al.’s (2010) analysis shows that it is the mean of a cat-
egory, not the mean of the range ends (or for that matter, the mode 
or median of the category) that should be (and was empirically) 
Figure 5 | Proportion of “yes” responses (A, B, M ± SeM) and reaction times (C, M ± SeM) in Wide-8 experiment, with wide spacing between stimulus 
locations and eight test locations.
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(Hanson, 1959; Thomas, 1962), the peak of responding shifts 
beyond S+ in the direction away from S−. In humans in contrast, 
other effects irrelevant to or opposite to the peak-shift account 
based on absolute gradients are found. Thus, a larger test range 
beyond S+ leads to more peak shift (Thomas et al., 1992), an effect 
that needs to be interpreted as a range effect. This range effect is 
even found with two S+s, on either side of a single S− (Thomas 
et al., 1991, Experiment 3 on line angles). Even more strikingly, 
with a range extending a good ways beyond S− during tests without 
feedback, range effects predominate and the peak shifts toward or 
even beyond S− (Newlin et al., 1979; Thomas et al., 1991). This 
range effect is understandable on the basis of averaging the category 
mean, as already discussed. But it is pertinent to consider two fur-
ther issues: (1) is it the memory for the metric value of S+ that has 
been averaged with the categorical mean, or is it instead a boundary 
between S+ and S−, and (2) why is the classic peak-shift effect found 
in some cases, for instance in our hands (Cheng and Spetch, 2002; 
Spetch et al., 2004)? We consider these issues in turn.
The amount of training on the target should affect range 
effects as well, according to adaptation-level theory and the func-
tional predictions of CAM. Mechanistically, the more the train-
ing, the stronger that adaptation level for the training stimulus. 
Functionally, the more the training, the better the memory for 
the target stimulus, and the more it should be weighted. Results 
have been inconsistent, with one study finding no difference in 
range effect with 11 vs. 21 times of lifting a target weight (Hébert 
et al., 1972), and another study finding less range effect with more 
training (Giurintano, 1972), reported in (Thomas, 1974, 1993). 
Thomas (1993) reported a pilot experiment in which intentional 
learning conditions led to less range effect than incidental learning 
conditions (see his Figure 2). Thomas (1993) suggested that nega-
tive results might have arisen because participants had reached 
asymptotic performance levels in all conditions.
The CAM needs an extension to account for the next results dis-
cussed by Thomas (1993), those from Newlin et al. (1978). Newlin 
et al. used light intensities in generalization tests, but added the 
manipulation of pre-exposure, either to stimuli brighter than the 
training target or to dimmer stimuli. Then the target was presented, 
followed by generalization tests designed to elicit range effects, with 
the target at one or the other end of the range. One interpretation 
of the CAM is to put pre-exposure trials as part of the category 
formation process together with the post-target tests. This would 
predict that pre-exposure to dim lights should shift the peak of 
responding to dimmer values, while pre-exposure to bright lights 
should shift the peak of responding to brighter values, both by 
affecting the coding of the category mean. The results were in the 
opposite direction.
If categories are useful for retrieving memories, they may well 
be useful for coding memories as well. Thus, when a dim target is 
presented after pre-exposure to a series of bright stimuli, it would 
be adaptive to code it as being on the dim side of a category, much 
as adaptation-level theory would suppose (Figure 6). Functionally, 
this adds some extra information to the code: the target is both a 
particular brightness (metric information) and on the dim side 
of a category (categorical information). The functional advan-
tage of using categorical information is that it adds another cue, 
the use of multiple cues adding accuracy even at the expense of 
systematic bias.
Thus, we may conceive of the participant as learning a dis-
crimination in the pre-exposure and training, learning the target 
as S+ and the pre-exposure stimuli as S−s. We suppose that the 
metric value of a level of brightness is difficult to remember, in 
contrast to the target location in our study, so that the categorical 
information gathered at encoding would be weighted relatively 
more. The post-exposure experience then, shifts the memory of 
the category middle, relative to which the target stimulus is in part 
coded (Figure 6). Independent predictions from this interpretation 
deserve to be tested.
Peak-shift experimental paradigms in humans have provided 
strong support for adaptation-level theory (Thomas, 1993), often 
trumping interpretations in terms of gradients of excitation and 
inhibition based on absolute stimulus levels (Spence, 1937). In 
training in peak-shift experiments, the participant is presented 
with both a target stimulus, S+, and a number, typically one, of 
non- target, S− stimuli. In classic peak-shift results from pigeons 
Figure 6 | explanation of some of Newlin et al.’s (1978, experiment 1) 
data. (A) A condition in which participants were first pre-exposed to bright 
stimuli, and then presented a target at brightness level 4 (top, 1 = dimmest, 
11 = brightest). We suppose that the subjects encodes a boundary separating 
two categories, with the target coded as being in the dim category. The 
categorical code provides additional information to the encoding of the metric 
value of the target brightness. On tests (bottom), the range of stimuli is more 
or less centered on the category boundary, so that the boundary does not 
shift during tests, and a “correct” generalization gradient peaking at 4 is found 
(Newlin et al.’s Figure 1). (B) A condition in which participants were first 
exposed to dim stimuli, and then presented a target at brightness 4 (top). We 
suppose that the participant would encode a boundary somewhere between 
3 and 4. On tests (bottom), the range serves to shift the encoded category 
boundary toward the brighter end, thus causing large range effects (Newlin 
et al.’s Figure 1). The shift occurs because the boundary was somewhere in 
the middle of the range before tests (in pre-exposure and target training), and 
the subject is relying on the “middle of the range” description (a categorical 
code) in part in determining the boundary during tests.
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1992), in this case overrepresenting one end or the other of the test 
range. This latter effect of the proportion of S− to S+ on tests cannot 
be explained by a signal detection account such as that presented 
recently by Lynn et al. (2005) for bumblebees. In the signal detection 
explanation, the point of peak shift is to avoid the error of misiden-
tifying S−, or making false positives. With a higher proportion of 
S− on tests, this probability is increased, and the detection criterion 
should be more stringent, moving the generalization gradient in 
the opposite direction away from S−. This point cautions us that 
different functional accounts, both with the imprimatur of Bayesian 
analysis, can generate different predictions, and conditions under 
which each account may hold need very careful analysis. So does 
the issue of differentiating categorical encoding during stimulus 
learning and during tests.
On issue (2), conditions favoring better learning of the bound-
ary ought to reduce range effects in peak-shift experiments, and as 
a consequence favor results in line with classic peak-shift effects. 
Thomas (1993, Figure 7) presented results showing that in a peak-
shift experiment, more training with S+/S− discrimination led to 
smaller range effects on tests without feedback. This makes func-
tional sense because if the boundary between S+ and S− is better 
learned, the participant should rely on it relatively more, and be 
less affected by the category mean on tests. To obtain peak shift 
effects, or at least to examine closely the conditions affecting peak 
shift, we have given ongoing training with S+/S− discrimination, 
only occasionally slipping in short blocks of tests without feedback 
(Cheng and Spetch, 2002; Spetch et al., 2004). These are conditions 
that minimize the weight given to the average found during testing. 
We also used symmetric test ranges to minimize any range effects. 
Both these factors understandably eliminate range effects, allowing 
us to examine conditions for peak shift.
The last kind of data that Thomas (1993) considered came from 
pigeons. Many studies have examined generalization gradients, 
but most present a single range in any condition that is more or 
less centered on the S+ (e.g., Guttman and Kalish, 1956; Blough, 
1961), data that do not address the issue of range effects. In one 
case, well-trained pigeons have not shown central tendency shift 
(Thomas and Barker, 1964). Mechanistically, this might be expected 
because the pigeons had established a very strong adaptation level 
to the training stimulus. Functionally, a reliable encoding of the 
stimulus value should mean that it should be weighted most, with 
the categorical coding given little weighting. With far less training, 
it proved possible to obtain central tendency shift (Giurintano, 
1972, as reported in Thomas, 1974). This was accomplished by first 
training pigeons extensively on one stimulus dimension (color), 
and then switching to a different stimulus dimension (line angle), 
which they could then learn quickly. Range effects have also been 
found on a successive discrimination task with flicker rate as the 
stimulus dimension (Hinson and Lockhead, 1986), quite a different 
experimental paradigm. Thus, with only a small amount of training, 
approaching the conditions of minimal training given to humans, 
the pigeons’ behavior resembled that of humans.
conclusIons
While the results from this study provide limited support for our 
predictions based on the CAM (Duffy et al., 2010), the larger picture 
of how the model accounts for a body of extant data impresses us. 
On issue (1), other results clearly implicate the boundary rather 
than the metric value, giving some credence to our interpretation of 
Newlin et al.’s (1978) results. The spacing between S+ and S− affects 
the extent of range effects, a result that only makes sense if it is the 
location of the boundary that is at play rather than the metric value 
of S+. Thus, with the same S+ and the same test range, an S− more 
distant from S+ leads to a greater range effect than an S− closer 
to S+ (brightness levels: Thomas et al., 1973, 1991). Such a result 
cannot be accommodated by assuming that it is the metric value of 
S+ that is being averaged with a category mean. In that scenario, the 
value of S− would not matter. The interpretation must invoke both 
a boundary and coding of S+ relative to the boundary. Consider 
an example from Thomas et al. (1973). Subjects in the 5-2 group 
were presented level 5 brightness as S+ and level 2 brightness as S−, 
while subjects in the 5-4 group were presented level 5 brightness as 
S+ and level 4 brightness as S−. All were then tested on the range 
1–9, symmetric about S+. A group without S− showed a roughly 
symmetric generalization gradient with the peak at 5. Both the 
5-2 and 5-4 groups showed peak shifts away from S− (i.e., peaks 
at values greater than 5), with the 5-2 group showing more shift. 
We, along with Thomas (1993) suppose that the subject codes the 
S+ in terms of its relation to a boundary (adaptation level), which 
serves to distinguish it from S−. For the 5-2 group, S+ is encoded 
as being a good deal beyond the boundary; for the 5-4 group, it is 
encoded as a little beyond the boundary. The boundaries would of 
course differ for the two groups, but we suppose that the memory 
for the exact boundary is weak while the memory for the amount 
beyond the boundary is much better. During tests then, the cat-
egorical mean of the test range biases the memory of the boundary. 
If the categorical mean is weighted a lot, which is predicted based 
on Bayesian grounds if the memory for the boundary is not good, 
then the bias will bring the boundaries for the two groups close 
together, both near 5, the mean of the test range. Because the 5-2 
group remembered S+ as a good deal beyond the boundary, they 
would show a larger range effect.
A similar interpretation can be given to differential range effects 
arising from different ratios of S− to S+ during training (Thomas 
et al., 1985). If S− is overrepresented during training, the bound-
ary is shifted toward S−, and S+ is coded as being a lot beyond the 
boundary. If in contrast S+ is overrepresented during training, the 
boundary is shifted toward S+ and S+ is remembered as a little 
beyond the boundary. In subsequent testing without feedback, the 
uncertainty about the boundary again means that the boundaries 
in both conditions shift to somewhere near the mean of the test 
range, for adaptive reasons. Because S+ is remembered as further 
from the boundary in the S− overrepresented group, this group 
should show a larger peak shift, which is precisely what Thomas 
et al. (1985, Experiment 1) found for the brightness dimension. If 
on the other hand, S+ and S− were presented equally often during 
training, but differentially during testing without feedback, then 
the results were opposite (Thomas et al., 1985, Experiment 2). In 
this case, as discussed previously, the differential ratio of S− to S+ 
on tests drives the category mean based on test experience differen-
tially. Memory of the category mean is averaged with the memory 
of the boundary. Overrepresentation of S− drives this mean toward 
S−, and averaging with such a mean lessens the peak shift effect. 
A similar effect was obtained for line angle stimuli (Thomas et al., 
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uncertain metric value with a category mean. The metric value 
in question may be that of a particular target stimulus, or that of 
a boundary between the target stimulus and something else (the 
S−s). This large set of results was not selected for review with the 
CAM in mind. They were a comprehensive body of results that 
an adaptation-level theory, with some adjustments in some cases, 
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